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Abstract: This paper aims to explain differences in infant mortality across the colony of 
Quebec, known in the 1850s as Canada East, by institutional settings. Areas settled 
under French laws (known as seigneurial law) implied important transfers from peasants 
to landlords through private taxes and duties, restrictions on mobility, scant provision of 
public goods and disincentives to invest in agricultural productivity. As a result, areas 
under this law system tended to be poor and prone to high mortality. Upon conquering 
Quebec, the British maintained French land laws but, in 1791, the boundaries of its 
application were frozen – all newly settled lands would be under British land laws. By 
1851, the two legal systems had cohabited for six decades – allowing us to compare 
them. Using the 1851 census, we argue that French seigneurial law – which reduced 
living standards through a variety of channels – translated into higher rates of infant 
mortality. After estimating a Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression we find that 
the effect of seigneurial tenure results in an increase in infant death rates from 43.79 to 
44.89 for the age group below one and from 5.21 to 5.277 for the age group from one to 
five. Additionally, we conduct robustness checks by limiting the sample to large 
settlements and changing the age groups for the dependent variable.1  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Acknowledgements go to Livio di Matteo, Jari Eloranta, Miikka Voutilainen and Taylor Jaworski 
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Introduction 
This paper tackles the issue of institutional factors in the determination of mortality 
differentials across the colony of Quebec in the 1850s, when it was known as Canada East. The first 
decades of the 19th century are associated with the impression of poor economic performance in 
Quebec and that the colony had very high mortality rates. Most of the literature has either stressed 
deficient foreign market demand for exports from Quebec (Ouellet 1966, 1972, 1980; McCallum 
1980; Cole 2009; Courville 2008) in combination to varying explanations of overpopulation. Few 
scholars entertain the possibility that the problems were linked to the institution of seigneurial 
tenure. This system, feudal in nature, was imported by the French when they colonized Quebec and 
was then kept by the British when they conquered in 1760. However, after 1791, all newly settled 
lands would operate under British land laws. As a result, seigneurial tenure and free and common 
tenure would co-exist until the abolition of the former in 1854.  Using the census of 1851-52, we 
show that there were wide variations in mortality across the colony – differences that strongly 
follow the institutional lines that emerged after 1791. This could have occurred through numerous 
channels that would increased economic vulnerability: predatory taxation, monopoly power and 
restrictions on mobility. The data from the census of 1851-52, all things held equal, shows that the 
infant mortality rate and the infant mortality rates and quotients were higher in areas under 
seigneurial law than those under freehold tenure.  
Overall, these results suggest that populations pressures – often emphasized in literature on 
Quebec – have been misidentified. We argue that the signs of institutional pressures were mistaken 
for signs of population pressures.  
 
1. Population pressures in Lower Canada 
The generally accepted viewpoint for Lower Canada is that population pressures 
materialized during the course of the 19th century as a result of soil erosion, poor farming practices 
and a rapid growth of population while available farmland grew scarcer.  This use of population 
pressures was meant as a tool by numerous historians to explain a prolonged economic crisis in 
which poverty increased dramatically (Jones 1943; Ouellet 1966, 1972, 1980; McCallum 1980). 
Historians of Quebec have often portrayed it as a society rife with Malthusian pressures (in honor of 
T.R.  Malthus’  work).    The  eminent  Fernand  Ouellet  (1966)  asserted  that the colony lived through an 
"economic crisis" from 1802 to the late 1840s mainly because of soil erosion and overpopulation of 
the colony. After years of farming, land quality was deteriorating, marginal lands were being settled 
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and population growth meant that there were an increasing number of individuals per unit of land.  
This meant deterioration in living standards. In turn, the deterioration in living standards increased 
the vulnerability of population to exogenous shocks. Supply-side shocks (or even demand-side 
shocks through changing conditions on foreign exports markets) would thus have disproportionate 
effects on mortality given the vulnerability of the population. This view is still commonly portrayed 
by popular historians (Bédard, 2012).  
However, recent research has questioned this interpretation from two angles. On the first 
hand, recent measurements of living standards suggest that growth of per capita income was 
actually positive. Bédard and Geloso (2014) have proposed an average annual growth rate of real 
per capita income varying between 0.28% and 0.36% between 1790 and 1830 while Paquet and 
Wallot (2007) have found growth rates slightly above those for the same period (around 0.9% per 
annum). Marvin McInnis (1982) and Courville (2008) also questioned the claim of a prolonged 
crisis. However, it is relevant to point out that these rates of growth are very modest in comparisons 
with rates achieved in the United States (Lindert and Williamson 2013).  
Secondly, Geloso and Kufenko (2015) used a VAR analysis approach to study short-run 
fluctuations in birth rates and death rates, concluding that there were no signs of population 
pressures during the 19th century. They argued that while economic growth might have been 
disappointing, it was not the result of population pressures.  In fact, they point out that these 
pressures were present earlier, in the 18th century when land was abundant which stands in stark 
contradiction with the logic underlined by proponents of population pressures as an explanation of 
poor economic performance.   
 
2. Population pressures and institutions in Lower Canada 
The  problem  of  these  reinterpretations  of  Quebec’s  poor  economic  performance  is  that they 
merely minimize the importance of population pressures, they offer no counter-explanation. We 
seek to propose such a new interpretation centered on the role that institutions might have played. 
More precisely, we propose that pressures caused by institutions masqueraded as population 
pressures.  
In their study of living standards in England from 1270 to 1870, Broadberry and al. (2015) 
show   that   there   is   a   “Smithian”   counter-effect   to   those   of   overpopulation.   The   terms   “Smithian”  
refers  to  Adam  Smith’s  (1774)  claim  the  size  of  the  market  determines  the  scope  for  specialization. 
Population growth expands the size of the market, allowing for greater specialization which meant 
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less stress on resources. To compound this effect is the return to scale from greater population 
which means that there are increasing returns from large projects like infrastructure (Boserup 1965; 
Simon 1977). As a result, Broadberry and al. (2015: 272-278) reject the idea that population 
pressures are a strong explanation (although they do not dismiss that it must have played a role). 
Their results are also echoes of earlier works by Nicolinni (2007), Crafts and Mills (2009) who 
suggest to various degrees that in Great Britain, the pressures were largely alleviated from the 15th 
century onwards. The   “Smithian   counter-effect”   is   basically   refers   to   a   debated literature in 
economics   that   concerns   “scale   effects”   (Mokyr   1990).   Scale   effects   arise   when   ideas   (read:  
information) are non-rival inputs in the production of intermediate goods needed to generate final 
products and that there are important economies of scale. As population increases, more and more 
inputs are cheaply made available for intermediate production. The implication of scale effects is 
that population growth should be accompanied with economic growth and that populous economies 
should grow faster than smaller ones. This has led many economists to deride the concept (Lucas 
1993: 263), especially since the empirical support is limited (Jones 1995).  However, the idea should 
not be discarded as Lewis Davis (2008) points out since population is a poor proxy variable for 
ideas. Davis argues that, out of analytical convenience, population size was used as the proxy for 
non-rival information that could support expansion in trade. If transaction costs are falling while 
there is an increase in international trade and a stable population level, Davis argues that the 
“potential  for  exploiting  non-rival  ideas  has  grown  much  faster  than  (…)  population  size”  (417)  but  
scale effects materialize. Hence, as population increases, there can be scale effects as long as 
transaction costs do not increase so as to offset the benefits of the scale benefits.  The institutional 
setting in place can create transaction costs sufficiently important to generate the problems of 
population pressures. Consequently, the problem of population pressures results from institutional 
problems that limit the Smithian and Scale counter-effects.  
Some institutions seem to enhance these counter-effects. For example, Dribe, Olsson and 
Svensson  (2012)  found  that  Sweden’s  manorial  estates  acted  as an institution which minimized the 
effects of short-run variations on mortality – albeit modestly – at a time when capital markets were 
imperfect (preventing the smoothing of consumption) and that stored food was not sufficient to 
counteract adverse shocks to supply. Kelly and Ó Gráda (2014) found that the systematic 
introduction of poor relief in England coincided with the disappearance of the link between 
variations in real wages and variations in the crude mortality rate.  
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But institutions can also limit these counter-effects – and we will argue here that this was the 
case of Quebec. As A.W. Carus and Sheilagh Ogilvie point out in the case of the institution of 
serfdom,   it   was   not   “that   markets   were   missing   in   serf   societies”   but   rather   than   “landlords  
intervened  in  markets  in  such  a  way  as  to  redistribute  to  themselves  part  of  the  profits  from  serfs’  
market   participation”   (2014:   479).   In   doing   so,   the   institution   of   serfdom   would   have   lowered  
economic   growth   by   reducing   the   ability   of   the   “Smithian”   offset to materialize.  It could also 
transfer important resources to rent-seekers who produce very few public goods. If given a certain 
legal power to tax peasants and restrain their mobility, the landlord could enact redistribution of 
income towards himself thus pushing numerous peasants towards a poverty line. Normally, when 
given such powers under manorial systems, landlords had to provide public goods.  However, they 
did not always provide them (Ogilvie 2007), and when they did, they may not have been those that 
maximized welfare (Moselle and Polak 2001). Thus these landlords enacted predatory taxation.   
Another channel, emphasized by Mokyr (1983) is that of insecurity in landholding. This 
insecurity discouraged peasants from realizing investments that would have increased productivity 
and thus to insufficient capital formation. Olsson and Svensson (2012) show that greater security in 
ownership allowed Swedish food production to outpace population growth after 1780. Absent such 
security, the investments that could generate such outcomes would also be absent, making the 
population poorer.  
All of these channels would have pushed populations closer to a poverty line where shocks 
have disproportionate effects on survival chances. In short, if the rent-seekers from institutional 
arrangements redistribute wealth sufficiently in their favor, they could increase the vulnerability of 
the population to exogenous shocks by increasing their odds of mortality.  
In Lower Canada, the institution of seigneurial tenure could have acted as such. Imported 
from France in the 17th century, under seigniorial law a landlord would buy a landed estate from the 
crown and with that acquisition was associated some obligations. The landlord (seigneur) was 
required to grant (freely) land to peasants which would become censitaire. The censitaire would pay 
the seigneur a rent for the acquisition and use of the land granted which were called cens et rentes.  
These rates were established in relation to land held rather than the amount of land actually farmed 
(they could be legally construed as taxes on assets rather than output). However, (and this is a key 
point to remember), the censitaire could not simply abandon his land. Once settled, a peasant could 
only leave the estate if he sold his farm, subject to the lods et ventes tax (see below). This was an 
important restriction on mobility.  
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In return, the seigneur would have to provide grist mills to the peasants (he was obligated to 
do so) and he was only allowed (by royal edict) to charge one fourteenth of the grains brought to the 
mill to be turned into flour (this was known as the Banalité). The peasant was not allowed to use 
grist mills in neighbouring seigneuries. Other obligations would be associated like that of the corvée 
where the peasants would have to do work for the seigneur on certain days (generally three days or 
sixty sols per day if he decided not to work). The censitaire was also subjected to the lods et ventes 
which required he pay an 8.5% tax to the seigneur upon selling his land. The seigneur himself was 
obligated to pay the Quint which was also a tax to be paid upon selling the estate, but he would to 
pay this to the crown. There were other minor obligations, but they are not of relevance to our story 
here. To all of these were added the dîme – a religious tithe charged by the Church who generally 
also wore the hat of seigneur at the same time. The tithe represented one twenty-sixth of gross grain 
output. Unlike the cens et rentes, the dîme applied to output rather than assets.  
Finally, the seigneur had monopoly right on the establishment of mills and access to water 
ways. Moreover, the seigneur had the right to tax everyone on his estate which acted as a tax on 
such activities. Generally, seigneurs would be active in numerous forms of investments from the 
flour mill to the saw mill. After the Conquest in 1760, the British maintained the institution. In fact, 
numerous seigneurs would actually end up serving as high-ranking officials in the colonial 
administration through the Legislative Council of Lower Canada. With the Constitutional Act of 
1791, the British opted to allow all new settlements to occur under British freehold tenure law. 
Seigneurial law would remain in place where it was already established. The newly settled areas 
would be legally known as townships rather than parishes. In townships, none of these duties and 
monopolies existed.  
The burden of seigniorial tenure was not insignificant. Richard Harris (1966 [1984]) 
estimated seigniorial dues somewhere between 5% and 10% of the average farm household income 
and Louise Dechêne (1974) put that figure at 14% of household income. However, both authors 
relied on hypothetical scenarios based only on gross output. This problem was solved partially in the 
works of Morris Altman. He used census data to estimate that seigniorial dues absorbed between 
37% and 47% of net output per household (measured in wheat minus consumption needs and seed 
requirements) in the 1688-1714 period. By 1726-1739, it had declined to a share ranging between 
26% and 37%. Alan Greer (1985:136) used that approach to estimate a proportion of 44% in St-
Ours (on the south shore of Montreal) in 1765. In 1987, Altman revised his estimates downwards by 
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half as a result of new data on seed requirements, but the costs to farm households was still 
considerable.  
According to Altman, the transfer from peasants to seigneurs reduced disposable income. 
Lower incomes for the peasant population meant that the market for non-agricultural goods was 
smaller and hence the scope for specialization was reduced. Even if the seigneurs gained an 
important income, they did not represent a great pool of potential consumers for new industries.  In 
essence,  Altman’s  argument  was  a  Keynesian  demand-side argument whereby lower income for the 
vast majority led to lower demand which meant slower growth and more poverty.  Altman also 
argues that exactions made by seigneuries were purely extractive and were not meant to finance the 
production of public goods that would enhance overall welfare.  
All of these effects also do not include the role that the monopoly rights of seigneurs could 
have played. Indeed, seigneurs were free to establish mills, plants, foundries and factories in their 
estates without being submitted to the cens et rentes and the lods et ventes. Any competitor to the 
seigneur would have to pay these duties, which are basically taxes on capital stock and capital 
transfers. The seigneur would not.  
In addition, the system of seigneurial could have hindered agricultural growth. The best 
summary available is that regard is that of Percy and Szostak (1992) where they study the abolition 
of  seigneurial  tenure  and  state  that  “the  negative  effects  of  seigneurial  tenure  on  the  economy  appear  
to have been exaggerated”.  To  make  that  claim,  they  rely  on  a  paper  by  Lewis  and  McInnis  (1980)  
that showed very small differences in total factor productivities across ethnic lines with the census 
of 1851 of Canada East (as Quebec was then known) which Percy and Szostak assume extends 
along institutional lines. The problem is that the differences underlined in the Lewis and McInnis 
paper are by no means small, and are probably understating the reality.  
First of all, there is gap ranging from a 7.6% disadvantage to a 15.7% disadvantage over all 
regions in terms of total factor productivity. Using different computation methods, Morris Altman 
(1998) rejected their results and found larger differences in total factor productivity. Finally, Lewis 
and McInnis had estimated output based on uniform prices for the entire economy – a problematic 
assumption given the lack of integration between regional markets (Armstrong 1984). Armstrong 
argued that Lewis and McInnis overly favored remote French areas under seigneurial by 
overestimating the value of their output. Overall, the differences have been downplayed and should 
not have been.  
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 Comparing mortality across the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada shows a very 
distinctive pattern emerging along institutional lines. As figure 1 testifies, infant mortality rates on 
seigneurial estates in Quebec were substantially higher than those where British tenure laws were 
applied (at a ratio of nearly two to one). In addition, rates were also lower in the neighboring colony 
of Ontario (known interchangeably in 1851 as Upper Canada or Canada West). In fact, infant 
mortality was also lower in areas where there were large proportions of French-Canadians. The 
county of Bruce, which had the largest proportion of French-Canadians for all of the counties of 
Ontario (24.6%) also had an infant mortality rate well below the level of the entire colony excluding 
urban centres (28 per 1,000 against 55.2 per 1,000).  
 
Figure 1: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000) for different regions 
 
 
3. The Census of 1851 and research design 
To study the effects of seigneurial tenure on mortality, we will exploit the co-existence of 
seigneurial and free and common tenure laws and how, controlling for other factors, they impacted 
infant mortality. Our reason for selecting infant mortality is that it is the most reliable. Mortality 
after a certain age could be related to factors unrelated to seigneurial tenure – like work accidents. 
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More importantly, infants are more susceptible to suffer from adverse shocks. The effects of poverty 
are most robustly seen in childhood. Poverty increases vulnerability to shocks which meant that 
there could be wide swings in nutritional intake. For pregnant mothers, nutritional deficiencies 
meant they would have expended more energy than was required by their bodies which would 
impact the developing child and his early chances of survival (Meredith and Oxley 2014: 142-144). 
Poor nutrition during pregnancies implied that hormone production would be affected. This would 
hurt the fetus and lead to adaptations that are suited for short-term survival at the expense of 
potentially adverse lifetime effects. These effects which materialize later in life shorten life 
expectancy (Godfrey and Barker 2000). Otherwise, poor or unstable nutrition after birth could also 
increase risks of mortality.  
Secondly, the institutional feature of seigneurial tenure that limited mobility offers a strong 
testing ground.  After 1791, all newly settled lands would have to be settled under freehold. Upon 
the conquest of the colony by the British, the seigneurial system was maintained but in the 
Constitutional Act of 1791, it was frozen to the areas where it had already been established – it 
could not expand. Hence, by 1851, the two legal systems had cohabited side-by-side for six decades. 
More importantly, the restrictions on mobility seen in the seigneurial system would have prevented 
a colony-wide equilibrium to be achieved. As mentioned above, seigneurial tenure imposed a de 
jure limitation on the censitaire in the form of a restriction to abandon their lands. This was 
combined to a de facto limitation in the form of the lods et ventes which was a tax on capital 
mutation (one eight of the sale price of the farm had to be given to the seigneur). This meant that 
most   peasant   were   “locked-in”   and   that   differences   in   living   standards   could   subsist   between  
different areas. This offers a strong experiment to measure the importance of seigneurial tenure on 
living standards (through infant mortality).  
The census of 1851-52 is a suitable dataset to test this hypothesis. First, it breaks down 
mortality by age group which allow us to create three dependent variables. It was the first census to 
report tables of mortality by area so that we can measure mortality rates by areas, something which 
has already been done by Pelletier et al. (1997).  The first variable will be all deaths below the age 
of one per 1,000 births. The second will be all deaths between the ages of 1 and 5 relative per 1,000 
persons in that age group. The third will consider all deaths between the ages of 1 and 15 years of 
age per 1,000 in that age group. Variations in infant mortality below age one could be found 
between groups with identical socioeconomic conditions as a result of differences in breastfeeding 
and weaning practices (Haines 1985). There is some evidence that breastfeeding practices did differ 
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across ethnic lines (Cranfield and Inwood 2014: 249) and as a result, it is better to err on the side of 
caution. The effect of breastfeeding on mortality would be limited after one year of age, thus 
variables of mortality for children above the age of one act as a robustness. Moreover, the age 
breakdown provided in the census allows us to control for the issue of birth spacing. There is a 
relation between the probability of survival for young infant and the spacing between each birth 
(Cleland and Sathar, 1984; Gentil 2009; Steckel 1980) and thanks to the breakdown in the census, 
we can create a control variable for birth spacing.  
Secondly, the census of 1851-52 offers a great level of institutional mixity in many regions. 
It is necessary to point out that while there are clusters of townships (the Estrie region and the 
Saguenay region), there are many townships existing alongside seigneurial estates in the same 
counties. By the time of the census of 1851-52, the counties of Vaudreuil (west of Montreal), Two 
Mountains (north of Montreal), Terrebonne (northeast of Montreal), Rimouski (east of Quebec 
City), Ottawa, (west of Montreal), Nicolet (south of Trois-Rivières), Mississquoi (south of 
Montreal),   l’Islet  (south  of  Quebec  City),  Montmorency  (east  of  Quebec  City),  Leinster  (North  of  
Montreal), Kamouraska (east of Quebec City), Gaspé (east of Quebec City, close to New 
Brunswick), Dorchester (south of Quebec City) , Bonaventure (east of Québec, close to New 
Brunswick) and Beauharnois (south of Montreal) are all institutionally mixed.  In addition, the 
townships in the Saguenay are predominantly French-speaking and co-existing alongside French-
speaking seigneurial estates. In the Eastern Townships (Estrie region), there is cultural mixity 
(roughly 30% of the population of the area is French-speaking – up from 15% relative to the 1844 
census). This mixity offers a strong testing parameter.  
Thirdly, the census of 1851-52 also offers the possibility to create a wide set of control 
variables notably regarding agricultural productivity. The census reports acreage under each type of 
crops and the total quantity of crops harvested. As a result, we can compute yields for the most 
important types of crops which we will combine with a measure of land quality in the form of the 
length of the growing season (Atlas Agroclimatique du Québec 2015). Some adjustments are 
necessary however.  Different ethnic groups used different measuring units depending on where the 
censor collected the information (McInnis 1981). The vast majority of the population – the French-
speaking Catholics – used a measuring system whereby surface and volume were denominated in 
arpents and minots. Each arpent was equivalent to 0.845 acres and each minot was worth 1.107 
bushels. This means that one minot per arpent was more than 30% what a bushel per acre 
represented – a substantial difference. In the predominantly English-speaking Protestant townships – 
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mainly located in central Quebec along the border with the United States – measuring units were 
reported in acres and bushels. Marvin McInnis (1981) was the first to tackle this problem and 
proposed important corrections in the case of the 1851-52 census. Expanding on a method produced 
by Altman (1998) to improve upon McInnis, we proceeded to make the adjustments based on the 
ethnic composition of each area. The observations are available in volumes presented to the 
government of the Canadas (1853) and are recorded at the sub-district level. As a result, our dataset 
from the 1851 census is a cross-sectional dataset of more than 460 districts in the colony. Some 
areas were excluded like the district of Grosse-Île which had a very high mortality rate because it 
was a quarantine area for immigrants.  
 However, there are downsides to the census of 1851-52.  Pelletier et al. (1997) point out that 
there   the   era   is   the   “dark   ages”   for   the   study   of  mortality.   It   is   clear   from   the   census   aggregate  
outcomes that there is a case of underestimation of mortality. However, in our case, what is of 
interest is the not absolute level but the relative levels between townships and seigneuries. As long 
as the problems of the 1851 census are equally distributed along institutional lines, this does not 
pose a problem to our current research question that cannot be handled by proper econometric tools 
as we will see below. To test our hypothesis, we propose the following equation:  
 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7i i i i i i i i i iIM I B Y D N R F S u                   (1) 
 iIM  refers to infant mortality quotient (the four independent variables described above) in 
region i. The term iI  refers to the institution in place in region i (with 1=seigneurial). The term iB  
refers to our variable for birth spacing. That measure, which would affect infant mortality, is derived 
from the work of Steckel (1980) as the number of infants below age 10 relative to the female 
population between 15 and 50 years old. The level of that ratio would capture – partly - how much 
spacing there was between births. In addition, that variable would very likely control for cultural 
differences in behavior. The effects of culture on child mortality would appear through the impact it 
has on the behavior of parents. In combination with our different set of independent variables 
(which are meant to see the effects of culturally different breastfeeding habits), the variable for birth 
spacing would control for different cultural practices  that  could  have  effects  on  a  child’s  health.   iY  
refers to a vector of wheat yields (minots per arpent) and length of the growing season (in days) to 
measure the productivity of agricultural activities in the area. The term iD  refers to population 
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density. This is important since proximity to urban centres meant that infectious diseases could 
spread more easily in congested regions. Turpeinen (1973) found that death rates in Finland 
between 1816 and 1865 fell as one considers more backwater regions. We expect to find a similar 
relation whereby dense areas experience more mortality thanks to the ease that contagious diseases 
has to spread. We include iN  to measure the number of sawmills, fulling mills, carding mills, 
foundries, tanneries, distilleries, woolen factories and breweries per 1,000. The goal of this latter 
measurement is to capture for the effect of non-farm employment which increased income. Since all 
the other controls variables to see the effects of iI  are related to agriculture, some variations could 
be created by differences in non-farm work, which justifies the inclusion of iN .  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Complete sample Seigneurial Tenure Townships mean sd mean sd mean sd 
below 1 78.61 90.77 95.4 94.42 45.9 73.08 
from 1 to 5 14.81 17.11 17.02 17.1 10.6 16.35 
from 5 to 15 3.63 6.01 3.93 5.81 3.06 6.36 
tenure 0.66 0.48 
    dependents 60+ 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.03 
birth spacing 1280.21 248.64 1232.1 203.5 1372.17 297.3 
indsutry per 1000 3.3 4.82 2.4 2.93 5.03 6.86 
pupils share 38.6 28.18 40.43 21.74 35.12 37.38 
growing season 197.34 12.43 198.42 12.78 195.21 11.47 
wheat yield 7.8 2.74 7.62 2.51 8.16 3.11 
oats yield 26.9 245.21 15.07 10.17 49.8 419.83 
population density 13.21 12.18 10.67 5.18 18.06 18.6 
land cleared 37.96 24.28 42.51 20.74 29.25 27.97 
meat per person 132.46 168.37 127.88 54.86 141.21 277.47 
population < 1 77.06 56.9 92.71 56.38 47.15 44.73 
Population 1to 6 249.23 174.4 293.52 167.59 164.58 155.23 
Population 5 to 16 450.89 315.93 533.26 302.26 293.45 280.47 
distance > 200 km 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.27 0.22 0.41 
widows per 1000 47.82 32.84 51.05 33.46 41.66 30.78 
N 460 
 
302 
 
158 
  
We have also excluded the urban agglomerations of Quebec City, Trois-Rivières and 
Montréal. They were large urban areas with clear mortality differentials from the colonial average. 
In spite of their massive populations, each would count for only one observation had they been 
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included. This would have created a biased sample. The term iR  refers to the dependency ratio. The 
idea is that if there were a large number of older individuals within a household, available resources 
would have to be divided between them and young children, hence affecting their odds of survival. 
The variable is computed as the ratio of individuals above 60 years of age over the population aged 
between 15 and 60 years old. The term iS  aims to account for the recency of a settlement by 
measuring the share of land that has been cleared.  Term iF  denotes a vector of further controls: 
various variables which could contribute to the explaining the death rates which includes widows 
(which we expect to increase mortality), supply of meat (to capture access to proteins) and 
education (to capture any effects it may have on mortality). 
4. Results  
It is important to make a short digression about the estimation technique. As it follows from 
Figure A, the death rates are not normally distributed. Moreover, a Poisson distribution is unlikely: 
from Table 1 we can conclude that the variance of the death rates is not equal to the mean. Another 
feature of the death rates is the excess zeros, which can be seen on the distribution plots as well. 
Therefore, out of the methods for the analysis of count data, the Zero-inflated Negative Binomial 
regression (or ZINB) as in Long (1997, p. 244) and Lond and Freese (2006, pp. 535-538) was 
selected. The advantage of this model is that the excess or inflated zeros can be explained by a 
similar set of control variables and a logistic regression. Indeed, one could assume that the zero 
death rates are a consequence of good health; however, it is also plausible to assume that recent or 
small settlements simply had few children of this age group. Therefore, we add the total population 
of the related age group to each logit regression in order to explain the excess zeros. Another 
variable which turned out to be a good predictor for the inflated zeros is the number of widows per 
1000 population, since this population group is unlikely to have newborn children in general. In the 
tables we report two types of effects: the marginal effects for the count of deaths and the marginal 
effects for the probability of obtaining zero deaths.        
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present equation (1) estimated with the ZINB, which includes the part for 
the counts and the logit regression for the inflated zeros. The dependant variable for Table 2 is the 
Infant Mortality Rate below 1 year of age.  Table 3 and 4 show the results for the mortality quotient 
for ages 1 to 5 and 5 to 15 to test the sensibility of our results to deaths under one year of age. Same 
set of explanatory variables is used; however, into each logit equation for the inflated zeros the total 
population of the related age group is added: population below age of 1 for Table 2; population aged 
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1 to 6 for Table 3 and population aged 5 to 16 for Table 4. The intuition behind is that in certain 
villages there would be few children facing the risk of dying and this could be a significant predictor 
for zero death rates.  
Testing the robustness of the results is not limited to changing the age group of the 
dependent variable – we also limit the sample size to settlements with population above 200: in 
Table 2 these are columns 5, 6, 7 and 8; in Table 3 these are columns 13, 14, 15 and 16; in Table 4 
these are 21, 22, 23 and 24.  
The results show that seigneurial tenure did have an impact on infant mortality. Table 2 
shows that the effect of seigneurial tenure for infant mortality below one year of age is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and that the impact coefficient large: the presence of seigneurial tenure 
increases the mortality by 43.79 per 1000 births (see Table 2, column 3). For the settlements with 
population above 200 the effect is 44.89 (see Table 2, column 7). For seigneuries the marginal 
probability, the slope of the probability function, of observing zero deaths is 7.91% lower (see Table 
2, column 4). The same effect significant at the 5% level is observed in larger settlements: -7.79% 
(see Table 2, column 8).      
The raw data suggested that there could have been countervailing factor since households in 
seigneurial estates had a greater share of its population above the age of 60 than townships. Since 
older individuals – who have passed their prime age for working – could have competed with 
children for household resources, this could have explained partly the differences across 
institutional lines. We use the dependency ratio, defined as ratio of individuals above 60 years of 
age over the population aged between 15 and 60 years old to control for that fact. However, this 
effect turns out to be significant only in the equation for inflated zeros.  
For mortality between one and five years of age, the seigneurial tenure regime increases the 
mortality by 5.21 and 5.277 in larger settlements per 1000 births (see Table 3, columns 11 and 15). 
The tenure effect is still significant at 5% level. However, tenure is no longer a good predictor for 
inflated zeros. For the last age group, between five and fifteen, the tenure effect is not significant 
(see Table 4). Therefore across specifications for the age groups below one and between one and 
five years old (the most vulnerable groups), the tenure effect is robust; however, the effect vanishes 
when considering the last age group.  
The effects of the control variables are fragile: the length of growing season; wheat and oats 
yield; industrial activities per 1000 population and population density are significant; however, not 
in all specifications. One of the most important controls is the length of the growing season – 
14 
 
denoting environmental condition and the quality of agricultural lands – is statistically significant in 
the expected direction (longer seasons are associated with lower levels of deaths).  
As mentioned earlier, the results could be driven by outliers. Areas with small populations 
do represent most of the outliers. This is because in such small areas, the death of one child if the 
infant population is two registers as an infant mortality quotient of 500 per 1,000 while very few of 
the densely populated areas have such high figures. However, as we conclude from the tables, 
exclusion of small settlements with population below 200 does not considerably alter the results. 
After removing the outliers, the seigneurial tenure effect is still strong in Tables 2 and 3.  
Finally, we should consider the test results for our specification: the test on the over-
dispersion parameter alpha and the Vuong (1989) on the relevance of the equation for the inflated 
zeros. The alpha is significant and the test results suggest over-dispersion, which validates our 
choice in favor of the ZINB regression for all specifications. The Vuong (1989) test results for all 
specification are strong to suggest the need to explain the excess zeros.    
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Table 2: Death quotient below 1, regression results (ZINB, robust)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ZINB  below 1 
inflated  
logit 
ME  
(count) 
ME  
(p) 
ZINB  
below 1 
inflated  
logit 
ME  
(count) 
ME  
(p) 
tenure 0.428*** -0.681** 43.79*** -0.0791** 0.451*** -0.707* 44.89*** -0.0779** 
 
(0.125) (0.332) (10.92) (0.0382) (0.125) (0.363) (10.82) (0.0396) 
dependents 60+ 0.360 -10.92** 127.8 -1.267** 1.081 -9.640* 170.6 -1.062** 
 
(1.768) (4.613) (166.7) (0.522) (1.756) (4.940) (162.4) (0.530) 
birthspacing -0.000294 0.000166 -0.0275 1.93e-05 -0.000485* 0.000425 -0.0456* 4.69e-05 
 
(0.000272) (0.000616) (0.0259) (7.16e-05) (0.000259) (0.000692) (0.0242) (7.65e-05) 
indsutry per 1000 0.0249* 0.00898 2.116* 0.00104 0.0321** -0.00796 2.858** -0.000877 
 
(0.0144) (0.0233) (1.271) (0.00270) (0.0153) (0.0314) (1.343) (0.00346) 
pupils share -0.00494** 0.00844* -0.510*** 0.000980* -0.00481** 0.0120** -0.514*** 0.00132** 
 
(0.00202) (0.00467) (0.190) (0.000533) (0.00200) (0.00522) (0.187) (0.000567) 
growing season -0.00305 0.0203 -0.448 0.00236 -0.00185 0.0162 -0.289 0.00178 
 
(0.00435) (0.0131) (0.403) (0.00153) (0.00431) (0.0141) (0.394) (0.00156) 
wheat yield 0.0117 0.0169 0.888 0.00196 0.00671 0.0294 0.352 0.00324 
 
(0.0224) (0.0489) (1.975) (0.00566) (0.0218) (0.0484) (1.884) (0.00528) 
oats yield -7.69e-05** -0.00229 0.0133 -0.000266 -8.63e-05*** -0.000906* -0.000348 -9.98e-05 
 
(3.27e-05) (0.0178) (0.154) (0.00207) (3.16e-05) (0.000549) (0.00559) (6.20e-05) 
population density 0.0157* 0.00795 1.314 0.000922 0.0139 -0.000344 1.217 -3.79e-05 
 
(0.00887) (0.0209) (0.828) (0.00242) (0.00905) (0.0256) (0.823) (0.00283) 
land cleared 0.00177 -0.000316 0.159 -3.66e-05 0.00105 0.00831 0.0259 0.000916 
 
(0.00257) (0.00768) (0.243) (0.000892) (0.00248) (0.00896) (0.223) (0.000991) 
meat per person -0.00104 -0.000445 -0.0877 -5.17e-05 -0.000721 -0.00466 -0.0260 -0.000513 
 
(0.00105) (0.00125) (0.0930) (0.000145) (0.00103) (0.00288) (0.0934) (0.000317) 
widows per 1000 0.000783 -0.00353 0.100 -0.000409 0.000492 -0.00722 0.100 -0.000796 
 
(0.00203) (0.00530) (0.190) (0.000614) (0.00202) (0.00608) (0.188) (0.000667) 
population < 1 
 
-0.0315*** 
 
-0.00365*** 
 
-0.0285*** 
 
-0.00314*** 
  
(0.00547) 
 
(0.000495) 
 
(0.00529) 
 
(0.000496) 
Constant 5.099*** -2.905 
  
5.042*** -2.435 
    (0.965) (2.735)     (0.977) (2.942)     
ln alpha -0.597*** 
   
-0.618*** 
   
 
(0.0798) 
   
(0.0798) 
   LR test for alpha=0 1.90E+04 
   
1.80E+04 
   p value 0 
   
0 
   Vuong test 13.32 
   
13.06 
   p value 0 
   
0 
   AIC 9.552 
   
9.869 
   Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.303 
   
0.269 
   Observations 443 443 443 443 420 420 420 420 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Death quotient for ages 1 to 5, regression results (ZINB, robust) 
 
VARIABLES 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
ZINB  
from 1 to 5 
inflated 
logit 
ME  
(count) 
ME  
(p) 
ZINB  
from 1 to 5 
inflated  
logit 
ME 
 (count) 
ME  
(p) 
tenure 0.303** -0.0943 5.210** -0.0123 0.323** 0.0553 5.277** 0.00705 
 
(0.140) (0.353) (2.351) (0.0461) (0.146) (0.403) (2.421) (0.0512) 
dependents 60+ -1.144 -14.86** 19.61 -1.937** -1.123 -19.21* 24.03 -2.448** 
 
(2.071) (7.054) (37.69) (0.877) (2.410) (10.54) (40.19) (1.221) 
birthspacing 0.000239 -0.000480 0.00516 -6.26e-05 0.000179 -0.000749 0.00467 -9.54e-05 
 
(0.000246) (0.000594) (0.00447) (7.73e-05) (0.000250) (0.000674) (0.00462) (8.53e-05) 
indsutry per 1000 0.0419*** -0.0187 0.735*** -0.00244 0.0434*** 0.000120 0.726*** 1.53e-05 
 
(0.0100) (0.0222) (0.167) (0.00291) (0.0135) (0.0299) (0.229) (0.00380) 
pupils share 0.000599 0.00838 -0.0118 0.00109 0.000762 0.00984 -0.00918 0.00125* 
 
(0.00200) (0.00597) (0.0343) (0.000757) (0.00202) (0.00604) (0.0345) (0.000728) 
growing season -0.0114*** 0.00143 -0.190*** 0.000187 -0.0115*** 0.00185 -0.197*** 0.000236 
 
(0.00428) (0.0124) (0.0735) (0.00161) (0.00432) (0.0129) (0.0747) (0.00165) 
wheat yield 0.0117 0.0994** -0.0641 0.0129** 0.0144 0.0948** 0.0299 0.0121** 
 
(0.0232) (0.0465) (0.378) (0.00585) (0.0235) (0.0459) (0.389) (0.00563) 
oats yield 2.43e-06 -0.00101 0.00265 -0.000132 -2.01e-06 -0.00109 0.00239 -0.000139 
 
(3.29e-05) (0.000649) (0.00187) (8.63e-05) (3.35e-05) (0.000804) (0.00198) (0.000105) 
population density 0.00321 0.0270 -0.0172 0.00352 0.00248 0.0123 0.0141 0.00157 
 
(0.00881) (0.0191) (0.151) (0.00248) (0.0100) (0.0232) (0.176) (0.00296) 
land cleared 0.00167 -0.00624 0.0434 -0.000813 0.00149 -0.00908 0.0452 -0.00116 
 
(0.00280) (0.00742) (0.0495) (0.000975) (0.00288) (0.00768) (0.0506) (0.000997) 
meat per person -0.000634 0.00279 -0.0176 0.000364 -0.000604 0.00434 -0.0198 0.000553 
 
(0.000675) (0.00283) (0.0135) (0.000368) (0.000713) (0.00299) (0.0137) (0.000371) 
widows per 1000 0.00469** -0.00976* 0.102** -0.00127* 0.00414 -0.00590 0.0825* -0.000752 
 
(0.00212) (0.00521) (0.0406) (0.000681) (0.00257) (0.00582) (0.0475) (0.000754) 
population 1 to 6 
 
-0.00895*** 
 
-0.00117*** 
 
-0.00780*** 
 
-0.000995*** 
  
(0.00151) 
 
(0.000144) 
 
(0.00136) 
 
(0.000143) 
Constant 4.306*** 1.132 
  
4.398*** 1.166 
    (0.929) (2.611)     (0.951) (2.708)     
ln alpha -0.631*** 
   
-0.624*** 
   
 
(0.0944) 
   
(0.0979) 
   LR test for alpha=0 2511.7 
   
2491.56 
   p value 0 
   
0 
   Vuong test 10.62 
   
10.3 
   p value 0 
   
0 
   AIC 6.708 
   
7.007 
   Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.312 
   
0.244 
   Observations 448 448 448 448 421 421 421 421 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Death quotient for ages 5 to 15, regression results (ZINB, robust) 
 
VARIABLES 
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
ZINB  
from 5 to 15 
inflated 
logit 
ME  
(count) 
ME  
(p) 
ZINB  
from 5 to 15 
inflated 
logit 
ME  
(count) 
ME  
(p) 
tenure 0.167 -0.165 0.861 -0.0268 0.190 -0.166 0.929 -0.0276 
 
(0.194) (0.354) (0.765) (0.0568) (0.191) (0.354) (0.756) (0.0582) 
dependents 60+ -1.471 -7.122 3.022 -1.156 -1.558 -6.453 1.157 -1.073 
 
(3.271) (4.575) (13.61) (0.747) (3.327) (4.965) (13.61) (0.822) 
birthspacing 0.000754 -0.000399 0.00346* -6.47e-05 0.000552 -0.000146 0.00232 -2.43e-05 
 
(0.000475) (0.000673) (0.00194) (0.000109) (0.000482) (0.000747) (0.00192) (0.000124) 
indsutry per 1000 0.0179 0.0116 0.0561 0.00189 0.0197 -0.000718 0.0777 -0.000119 
 
(0.0239) (0.0236) (0.100) (0.00380) (0.0237) (0.0294) (0.0966) (0.00490) 
pupils share 0.000198 -0.00554 0.00763 -0.000899 0.000563 -0.00398 0.00667 -0.000661 
 
(0.00305) (0.00584) (0.0121) (0.000963) (0.00300) (0.00566) (0.0119) (0.000945) 
growing season -0.0212*** 0.00124 -0.0851*** 0.000202 -0.0210*** -0.00291 -0.0790*** -0.000483 
 
(0.00658) (0.0146) (0.0277) (0.00237) (0.00655) (0.0150) (0.0269) (0.00248) 
wheat yield 0.0475** 0.129** 0.0269 0.0210*** 0.0481** 0.123** 0.0501 0.0204*** 
 
(0.0207) (0.0543) (0.100) (0.00764) (0.0214) (0.0530) (0.0990) (0.00756) 
oats yield -0.00136 -0.00102 -0.00409 -0.000166 -0.000866 0.000668 -0.00414 0.000111 
 
(0.00126) (0.0102) (0.0163) (0.00165) (0.00312) (0.00323) (0.00865) (0.000536) 
population density 0.0285** -0.00372 0.117** -0.000603 0.0225* -0.0273 0.119** -0.00454 
 
(0.0134) (0.0221) (0.0585) (0.00357) (0.0133) (0.0311) (0.0579) (0.00496) 
land cleared 0.00635 0.0122* 0.00986 0.00198* 0.00666* 0.0138* 0.0106 0.00229** 
 
(0.00386) (0.00650) (0.0161) (0.00104) (0.00381) (0.00708) (0.0157) (0.00115) 
meat per person -0.00185* 0.000555 -0.00795 9.00e-05 -0.00195* 0.00127 -0.00906* 0.000212 
 
(0.00111) (0.00149) (0.00484) (0.000240) (0.00104) (0.00264) (0.00543) (0.000429) 
widows per 1000 0.00449 -0.0113** 0.0317** -0.00184** 0.00445 -0.0154** 0.0347** -0.00256** 
 
(0.00344) (0.00533) (0.0156) (0.000846) (0.00339) (0.00711) (0.0154) (0.00111) 
population 5 to 16 
 
-0.00471*** 
 
-0.000765*** 
 
-0.00462*** 
 
-0.000768*** 
  
(0.00108) 
 
(9.79e-05) 
 
(0.00114) 
 
(0.000107) 
Constant 4.004*** 1.568 
  
4.229*** 2.298 
    (1.549) (3.255)     (1.527) (3.478)     
ln alpha -0.333* 
   
-0.356* 
   
 
(0.178) 
   
(0.193) 
   LR test for 
alpha=0 502.02 
   
460.35 
   p value 0 
   
0 
   Vuong test 5.11 
   
5 
   p value 0 
   
0 
   AIC 4.249 
   
4.402 
   Cragg & Uhler's R2 0.266 
   
0.23 
   Observations 448 448 448 448 421 421 421 421 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Conclusion 
 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to highlight the existence of differences in 
mortality across institutional lines in Canada in the 19th century.  We documented the well-
known evidence concerning the weight of the burden imposed by seigneurial tenure. We 
proposed that this system of law had a wide array of effects from predatory taxation to increased 
poverty and monopoly power on local markets. As a result, seigneurial tenure rendered 
households more vulnerable to shocks and food intake would have varied sufficiently close to a 
point where there could have been important ill-effects on health – especially for children.  Using 
data from the 1851 census in combination with a set of geographical data to provide for controls, 
we show that seigneurial tenure did lead to significant differences in infant mortality: under 
tenure the death quotient was from 43.79 to 44.89 deaths per 1000 population higher in the age 
group below one and from 5.21 to 5.277 deaths per 1000 population higher for the age group 
from one to five. There were no statistically significant effects after the age of 5. These results 
are important for the interpretation of early Canadian history. It has long been argued that 
Quebec, now the second largest province in Canada accounting for nearly a quarter of its 
population and close to two-fifths in 1851, suffered from population pressures in the pre-
confederation era. It is argued that these population pressures materialized as less and less land 
remained available for more and more individuals – hence decreasing marginal returns. If that 
was true, newly settled lands under British land tenure laws were of poorer quality and should 
have had higher infant mortality (since they should have been poorer given the marginal 
productivity of these lands). They did not.  The long-settled areas under seigneurial law exhibited 
higher infant mortality, even when we introduce statistical controls. As a result, it seems fair to 
argue that population pressures might have existed – but they would be explained by the 
institution of seigneurial tenure which increased mortality by a combination of factors (from 
regressive income transfers to predatory taxation to disincentive effects).  
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Figure A. Distribution of the death rates 
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Die Ursachen der gegenwärtig hohen Arbeitslosigkeit in einigen europäischen Ländern sind 
nicht allein in 'Funktionsproblemen des Arbeitsmarktes' zu suchen, sondern auch in Nachfra-
ge- und Angebotsentwicklungen auf Güter- und Finanzmärkten. Im Promotionsschwerpunkt 
Globalisierung und Beschäftigung werden daher Dissertationsvorhaben gefördert, in denen 
die Beschäftigungseffekte gesamtwirtschaftlicher Entwicklungen untersucht werden - bei-
spielsweise von neuen Technologien, von Prozessen der Internationalisierung und System-
transformation, von marktseitigen Finanzierungsbeschränkungen oder von unterschiedlichen 
Strategien der Fiskal-, Geld- und Währungspolitik. 
 
Die Betreuung und Vernetzung der Arbeiten im Promotionsschwerpunkt entspricht der Ar-
beitsweise eines Graduiertenkollegs. Betreuer des Schwerpunkts und Herausgeber der 
Schriftenreihe sind folgende Hochschullehrer: 
 
Prof. Dr. Harald Hagemann harald.hagemann@uni-hohenheim.de 
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (520H) 
Universität Hohenheim  
D-70593 Stuttgart 
 
Prof. Dr. Heinz-Peter Spahn peter.spahn@uni-hohenheim.de 
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (520A) 
Universität Hohenheim  
D-70593 Stuttgart 
 
Prof. Dr. Hans-Michael Trautwein michael.trautwein@uni-oldenburg.de 
Fakultät II – Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre 
Carl von Ossietzky Universität 
D-26111 Oldenburg 
 
Dissertationsprojekte im Schwerpunkt können durch Promotionsstipendien des Evangeli-
schen Studienwerks e.V. Villigst gefördert werden. Bewerbungsunterlagen können unter 
folgender Adresse angefordert werden: 
Evangelisches Studienwerk e.V. 
Promotionsförderung 
Iserlohner Str. 25 
58239 Schwerte Tel.: 02304/755-215,  Fax: 02304/755-250 
 
Weitere Informationen zum Promotionsschwerpunkt sowie die Diskussionsbeiträge der 
Violetten Reihe im PDF-Format finden sich im Internet unter der Adresse: 
http://www.globalization-and-employment.de 
